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share lease." Under the arrangement, the tenant is
required to use the tenant's best efforts to farm the
land and produce marketable crops.  The taxpayer is
obligated to pay 50 percent of the costs incurred in the
activity (without regard to whether any crops are
successfully produced or marketed), and is entitled to
50 percent of the crops produced (or 50 percent of the
proceeds from marketing the crops).  For purposes of
paragraph (e)(3)(vii) of this section, the taxpayer is
treated as providing the farmland for use in a farming
activity conducted by a joint venture in the taxpayer's
capacity as an owner of an interest in the joint venture.
Accordingly, under paragraph (e)(3)(ii)(F) of this
section, the taxpayer is not engaged in a rental
activity, without regard to whether the taxpayer
performs any services in the farming activity.25
Trust as lessor
Another complication for land held in trust and rented to
a tenant is the statutory provision that trusts cannot claim
expense method depreciation.26 The question is whether a
grantor trust is a trust for this purpose.27 Under the
regulations, the income, deductions and credits in a grantor
trust are treated as received or paid directly by the grantor.28
Therefore, it can be argued that, for revocable inter vivos
trusts, the type of trust that has been growing most rapidly
in popularity in recent years, is essentially disregarded and
expense method depreciation could be claimed by the
grantor. It could also be argued that if the title to the
property is in the name of the trustee for the trust, the
statutory prohibition on expense method depreciation
applies. There appears to be no authority resolving the
question although the argument is compelling that, in the
case of grantor trusts, expense method depreciation should
be claimable.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
HOSTILE POSSESSION. The dispute involved 17
acres of hilly wooded land under title to the plaintiff. The
defendant entered the land knowing that the plaintiff had
title to the land. The defendant erected "no trespassing"
signs on the property, blazed and painted trees and
constructed roads on the property. The defendant hunted,
rode horses and drove vehicles on the property. The
defendant did not make any public claim to the property and
did not pay property taxes for the property. There were no
buildings on the property nor was the property used for
raising crops or livestock. The court held that the
defendant's use of the property was insufficient to transfer
ownership by adverse possession. In addition, the court held
that the defendant had not possessed the property under a
claim of right because the defendant admitted that the
defendant knew who owned the property when the
defendant entered onto the property. Moore v. Dudley, 904
S.W.2d 496 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
ANIMALS
HORSES. The plaintiff's decedent had purchased three
steers from the defendants who were tenants on a farm
owned by the other defendant. While the decedent was
helping the defendants load the steers on to a truck, the
decedent was fatally injured by the kick of a horse in the
corral with the steers. The horse was a six month old colt
which was recovering from injuries. The plaintiff alleged
that the defendants had told others that the colt was frisky
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and rambunctious, but the plaintiff produced no evidence
that the colt had kicked anyone else or that the defendant
knew that the colt was vicious or had dangerous
propensities. The court held that domestic animal owners
were liable under two standards of negligence: (1) strict
liability if the animal had a vicious or dangerous propensity
and the owners knew or should have known about the
propensity and (2) negligence if the owner failed to exercise
ordinary care necessary to prevent foreseeable injury. The
court held that the plaintiff failed to show that the horse had
any vicious or dangerous propensity in that a frisky or
rambunctious horse was not dangerous. The court also held
that the defendants were not liable for the injury because the
horse had not kicked anyone before; therefore, the injury
was not foreseeable under the circumstances. Jividen v.
Law, 461 S.E.2d 451 (W. Va. 1995).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
AUTOMATIC STAY. On the date of the Chapter 7
petition, the debtor was current on a loan secured by the
debtor's farm. On advice of the debtor's attorney, the debtor
did not make the next two monthly payments on the loan
until the trustee filed notice of abandonment of the farm
from the bankruptcy estate. The debtor then tendered the
missed payments, but the creditor refused the payments. The
creditor had not accelerated the note or sent notice of
foreclosure to the debtor. The court held that, under
Missouri law, the debtor had a reasonable time to cure
defaults and that the debtor had attempted to cure the
defaults within a reasonable time. The court noted that the
debtor had made late payments in the past without objection
by the creditor. Therefore, the creditor could not foreclose
against the debtor if the automatic stay was lifted as to the
creditor. The debtor filed notice of reaffirmation of the debt
and the creditor objected to the reaffirmation, stating that it
no longer wanted to do business with the debtor and could
not be forced to reinstate the loan. The court held that,
where a debtor was not in default at the time of the
bankruptcy petition and has made offer of payment within a
reasonable time such that the creditor could not accelerate
and foreclose the loan under state law, the creditor cannot
prohibit reaffirmation of the debt in the bankruptcy case.
The other issue involved the amount of attorney's fees the
creditor could charge. The court held that the creditor could
receive only attorney's fees for the process of monitoring the
creditor's rights in the bankruptcy case and could not receive
the fees charged in bringing the objection to the
reaffirmation. In re Thomas, 186 B.R. 470 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1995).
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS.  The debtor's Chapter 12
case was converted to Chapter 7 because of fraud by the
debtor in the case.  The Chapter 7 trustee sought to use
collateral estoppel in avoiding transfers by the debtor as
fraudulent transfers.  The court held that collateral estoppel
would not be applied because the previous finding of fraud
was more broad and did not specifically pertain to the
transfers sought to be avoided in the Chapter 7 case.
However, the court held that the trustee provided sufficient
evidence of fraud to require return of the fraudulently
transferred property. In re Graven, 138 B.R. 587 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1992), aff'd by unrep. D. Ct. dec., aff'd, 64 F.3d
453 (8th Cir. 1995)..
EXEMPTIONS
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtor claimed two tractors
as exempt tools of the trade under Wis. Stat. § 815.18(3)(b)
which provided for an exemption up to $7,500. The debtor
sought to avoid consensual nonpurchase money liens against
the tractors under Section 522. Wis. Stat. § 815.18(12)
prohibited the avoiding of consensual liens. The creditors
objected to the avoidance of their liens and argued that
Section 522(f)(3), passed in 1994, limited the avoidance to
$5,000. The court held that Section 522(f)(3) limited the
debtor's avoidance power to $5,000 because the debtor
chose the state exemptions and state law prohibited the
avoidance of consensual liens. In re Parrish, 186 B.R. 246
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1995).
CROP INSURANCE PROCEEDS. The debtor had
originally filed under Chapter 12 but converted the case to
Chapter 7 in early 1995. Post-petition, the debtor became
entitled to crop insurance proceeds from the loss of 1994
crops.  The court held that because the debtor became
entitled to the proceeds post-petition, the insurance proceeds
were estate property. However, under 7 C.F.R. § 401.5 of
the FCIC regulations, a bankruptcy trustee did not acquire
any interest in the insurance proceeds unless voluntarily
assigned by the debtor; therefore, the insurance proceeds
were exempt property. In re Clark, 186 B.R. 249 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1995).
EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT. The court held that
the debtor's federal earned income tax credit was eligible for
exemption under Ky. Rev. Stat. § 205.220(3) as a public
assistance benefit. In re Brown, 186 B.R. 224 (Bankr.
W.D. Ky. 1995).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
DISPOSABLE INCOME. The debtors had filed for
termination of their Chapter 12 case and discharge but an
unsecured creditor objected, arguing that all of the debtors'
disposable income had not been paid to the unsecured
creditors. During the plan, the debtors maintained a second
residence in the city where the debtors held jobs. The
debtors incurred commuting expenses from the city to the
farm where a hog confinement facility was operated while
the debtors sought a purchaser of the facility. The debtors
employed their children parttime to help with the farm and
hog facility and paid them $6.50 per hour for the work. One
child lived on the farm and attended high school. The other
child lived in the city in the second residence while
attending college. The court held that the costs associated
with the second residence were not includible in disposable
income because the costs supported the income from the
debtors' employment which helped fund the Chapter 12 plan
and the costs were less than would have occurred if the
debtors commuted to the jobs directly from the farm. The
court held that the costs of maintaining the hog facility were
not included in disposable income because the continued
operation of the facility increased its potential selling price.
The court also held that the employment of the children was
reasonable but that the amount paid was excessive, given
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the support provided by the debtors of room and board and
the expectancy that the children would normally help with
the farm as part of their family duty. The court did allow
wage costs for the children at minimum wage. The rest of
the wages was included in disposable income and had to be
paid to unsecured creditors before a discharge would be
granted. In re Meyer, 186 B.R. 267 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1995).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES. An involuntary
petition was filed against the debtor in September 1988 and
the debtor’s taxable year ended on December 31, 1988. The
IRS filed an untimely claim for the 1988 taxes and sought
administrative expense priority for the claim, arguing that
because the taxes became due post-petition, the taxes were
incurred by the bankruptcy estate. The court held that
because all of the taxable income was received by the debtor
pre-petition, the taxes were incurred by the debtor and not
the estate. The appellate court reached the same result but
held that the taxes were "incurred" by the estate. The
appellate court held that, although the taxes were incurred
by the estate, the taxes were allowed only a seventh priority
under Section 507(a)(7)(A)(iii) because the taxes were not
assessed before the petition and were assessible after the
petition. In re Pacific-Atlantic Trading Co., 64 F.3d 1292
(9th Cir. 1995), aff'g, 160 B.R. 136 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtors had filed an action
in the Tax Court challenging the IRS assessment of
additional taxes relating to a tax shelter investment. In the
Tax Court petition, the debtors included a request for
recovery of any overpayment of taxes. Before the Tax Court
hearing was held, the debtors filed for bankruptcy and
received a discharge. The Tax Court action was stayed by
the bankruptcy case and resumed once the discharge was
granted. The debtors argued that the resumption of the tax
case violated the automatic stay of Section 362(c)(1)
because the Tax Court decision could reduce the possible
overpayment of taxes claimed by the debtors. The court held
that the resumption of the Tax Court case did not violate the
automatic stay because the alleged overpayment was not
estate property and only the property of the debtors would
be affected by a Tax Court decision. Bigelow v. Comm'r,
65 F.3d 127 (9th Cir. 1995).
CLAIMS. The debtor filed for Chapter 7 and the case
was declared a no-asset case. The debtor had owed taxes for
1982 through 1985 but no claim was filed by the IRS or the
debtor. The IRS agreed that the taxes were dischargeable;
however, the IRS had filed a lien against the debtor's
property, which included only a residence. The debtor
sought to have the tax claim adjudicated in the Bankruptcy
Court by claiming that the residence was estate property and
the debtor could not afford to otherwise adjudicate the
validity of the IRS lien. The IRS sought dismissal because
adjudication of the lien issue by the Bankruptcy Court
would not increase the bankruptcy estate and the debtor had
not pursued other administrative remedies. The court held
that it could adjudicate the lien issue because the debtor
could benefit from the outcome; however, the court held
that the debtor should be required to first pursue
administrative remedies which did not first require payment
of the tax and that if those efforts proved fruitless, the
debtor could return to the Bankruptcy Court for adjudication
of those issues. In re Fyfe, 186 B.R. 290 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1995).
DISCHARGE. The debtor sought to discharge taxes
assessed for tax years more than three years before the
bankruptcy petition and for which timely returns were filed.
The assessments came after IRS disallowance of deductions
from tax shelters. The IRS argued that the taxes were
nondischargeable for willful attempt to evade payment of
the taxes because the debtor did not pay the taxes and did
not set aside funds for payment of the taxes. The court held
that mere failure to pay taxes when assessed did not amount
to willful attempt to evade taxes and held that the taxes were
dischargeable. In re Williams, 186 B.R. 521 (M.D. Fla.
1995).
The debtor filed an unsigned 1986 return on May 18,
1991 but did not pay the taxes owed. The IRS requested the
debtor to sign a declaration form and the debtor returned the
signed declaration on September 9, 1991. The debtor filed
for Chapter 7 on August 25, 1993 and sought to have the
1986 taxes declared dischargeable because the return for the
taxes was filed more than two years before the petition. The
court held that the return was not effectively filed until the
signed declaration was returned to the IRS; therefore, the
effective date of the return filing was less than two years
before the petition. In re Lee, 186 B.R. 539 (S.D. Fla.
1995).
T U R N O V E R . The debtors had requested their
employers to withhold excess federal income tax from their
wages for 1990. On their 1990 income tax return, the
debtors requested the IRS to apply the excess taxes to their
1989 tax liability; however, the IRS applied the refund to an
assessment for 1986 even though the debtors were not aware
of any assessment for that taxable year. The IRS then filed a
claim in the bankruptcy court for the 1989 taxes, penalties
and interest. The Bankruptcy Court held that the IRS was
required to apply the voluntary payment of taxes as
requested by the taxpayers and that the improper “seizure”
of the refund was subject to turnover to the bankruptcy
estate. The 1989 taxes would still remain a valid claim but
the 1986 taxes were dischargeable, for other reasons. The
appellate court reversed, holding that, because the payment
was in the form of an overpayment of tax, I.R.C. § 6402(a)
and Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-3(a)(6)(i) allowed the IRS to
allocate the overpayment to any prior tax liability. In re
Ryan, 64 F. 3d 1516 (11th Cir. 1995), rev'g unrep. D. Ct.
dec. aff'g, 166 B.R. 757 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1993).
COOPERATIVES
RIGHT OF INSPECTION. The plaintiffs were
members of a cooperative stock corporation which
processed, handled and marketed the dairy products
produced by the members. The stock of the corporation was
owned only by the board of directors who each owned one
share of stock. The board of directors was elected by
regional representatives elected by members in the regions.
The members did not own any stock but supplied the equity
for the corporation through contributions and retained
earnings. The plaintiffs sought to inspect the books of the
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corporation but were prevented by the board of directors.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of
law as to whether the members had a right of inspection
under Delaware corporation law. The court held that only
stockholders of record had the right of inspection and that
because the corporation restricted stock ownership only to
the board of directors, the members did not have a right of
inspection. The court noted that the members had chosen the
organizational form and were bound by the restrictions
created by that form. Shaw v. Agri-Mark, Inc., 663 A.2d
464 (Del. Super. 1995).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
CROP INSURANCE. See In re Clark, supra under
Bankruptcy.
IMPORTS. The FDA had issued an import alert that
canned mushrooms from China could be contaminated with
bacteria and issued a further alert that some canned
mushrooms ostensibly from Taiwan were actually from
China. The U.S. Customs required two shipments of canned
mushrooms from Taiwan to be held in bonded warehouses
pending investigation by the FDA which eventually
determined that the mushrooms were from China and were
contaminated with the bacteria. The FDA sought an order
allowing the seizure and destruction of the mushrooms
under 21 U.S.C. § 334. The importers argued that the FDA
could not seize and destroy the mushrooms because the
mushrooms never entered interstate commerce because the
mushrooms were always held under government
supervision. The importers wanted to reexport the
mushrooms. The court held that the mushrooms were in
interstate commerce when intercepted by the U.S. Customs
in that the importers had placed the mushrooms in the
stream of commerce which commenced when the
mushrooms were placed on board ships destined for U.S.
markets. The importer also argued that, because 21 U.S.C. §
338 could also apply to the mushrooms, the FDA was
required to allow reexportation and could not bring a
condemnation action under 21 U.S.C. § 334. The court held
that 21 U.S.C. § 338 would generally apply but where the
imported product was determined to be sufficiently
dangerous to the public health, the FDA could bring a
condemnation action in order to protect against subsequent
reimportation efforts. United States v. Food, 2998 Cases,
64 F.3d 984 (5th Cir. 1995).
WETLANDS. The plaintiff was a farmer who enrolled
in the 1988 and 1989 price support and production
adjustment program. The plaintiff's farm included two tracts
of wetlands which were planted in 1988 and 1989. A field
inspection by the SCS determined that the parcels were
converted wetlands and the plaintiff was denied any
program payments by the ASCS. The plaintiff appealed the
SCS determination through the national level. At each stage
of the state appeals, different scientists inspected the land
and records and determined that the parcels were converted
wetlands. The plaintiff was present for the inspections and
participated in all hearings. The court held that the denial of
payment was supported by the facts on records and that the
plaintiff received fair treatment in the hearings. The plaintiff
argued that 16 U.S.C. § 3822(a)(2), passed in 1990,
retroactively required the delineation and certification of a
wetlands map for the land before denial of any benefits. The
court held that the statute did not apply retroactively. The
plaintiff also challenged the use of historical aerial
photographs of the property. The court held that use of the
photographs was reasonable given the lack of other
historical data for the land and the routine use of such
photographs by the SCS for locating wetlands. Downer v.
United States, 894 F. Supp. 1348 (D. S.D. 1995).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].* The decedent had created an irrevocable trust for
two nieces and their five issue. The beneficiaries had the
power to withdraw their respective one-seventh share of any
contributions to the trust within 33 days after the
contribution was made. The decedent had contributed
$17,000 to the trust for the purchase of a life insurance
policy on the decedent's life. After the decedent's death but
before the expiration of the 33 day period, the beneficiaries
indicated in writing that they would not exercise their rights
of withdrawal. The IRS ruled that the beneficiaries must
include in annual income, the beneficiaries' share of income,
deduction and credit attributable to the portion of trust
corpus over which the beneficiaries had a right of
withdrawal in the tax year. The IRS also ruled that, because
the amount of the property released by each beneficiary did
not exceed $5,000 or 5 percent of the value of the aggregate
property out of which the withdrawal could have been
made, the decedent was considered the transferor for
purposes of GSTT and the decedent's GSTT exemption
amount could be allocated to the trust. Ltr. Rul. 9541029,
July 14, 1995.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent and spouse created a revocable trust which became
irrevocable upon the decedent's death. The decedent's share
of the trust and the decedent's estate property all poured
over to the trust. At the decedent's death, the trust was split
into a family trust and a marital trust which was further split
into three trust shares. The martial trust received as much of
the decedent's property so as to reduce the estate tax to zero.
One share received as much property as which could be
sheltered by the GSTT exemption amount. The surviving
spouse disclaimed the interest in the GSTT share. Under the
trust, the GSTT share passed to one of the other shares and
any estate taxes were to be allocated to that share to the
extent of the property passing because of the disclaimer.
The transferee share was QTIP. The IRS ruled that no
marital deduction was allowed for the GSTT share. Ltr.




The Senate version of the Budget Reconciliation Bill
(H.R. 2491) would increase the deduction for health
insurance payments for self-employed individuals from 30
174                                                                                                                                                               Agricultural Law Digest
*Agricultural Law Manual (ALM). For information about ordering the Manual, see the last page of this issue.
percent to 55 percent, effective Jan. 1, 1996. The Senate
version also would allow retiring farmers to roll over up to
$500,000 of gain from the sale of farm assets to an IRA.
ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX. The taxpayer had
employment wages as income and had taxable income
subject to alternative minimum tax. The taxpayer challenged
the constitutionality of the differences between the
calculation of alternative minimum taxable income from
employees and AMT income for self-employed persons.
The court held that the differences were constitutional in
that the differences were rationally related to the
congressional goal of a broad-based tax system. Rawlins v.
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1995-502.
C CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02.*
REORGANIZATIONS. A corporation owned a
manufacturing plant on land which had potential
environmental cleanup liabilities. The corporation
transferred all of its assets to a new corporation in exchange
for all of the new corporation's stock. The new corporation
assumed the contingent liabilities for any environmental
costs. The original corporation had not taken any action for
cleanup nor taken any deductions or adjustments to basis for
the contingent cleanup liabilities. The IRS ruled that the
amount of contingent environmental liabilities assumed by
the new corporation would not be included in any
determination as to whether the liabilities assumed by the
new corporation exceeded the basis of the assets received
from the original corporation. The IRS also ruled that the
environmental cleanup costs eventually incurred by the new
corporation would be deductible as business expenses or
capital costs, depending on the specific costs involved. Rev.
Rul. 95-74, I.R.B. 1995-46.
DEPRECIATION-ALM § 4.03[4].* The taxpayers were
professional violinists who purchased 19th century bows for
their violins. The taxpayers claimed depreciation deductions
under ACRS for five-year property. The IRS argued that the
bows were not eligible for depreciation because the bows
did not have a determinable life since the bows would only
appreciate in value as historical art objects. The court held
that the taxpayers were not required to prove a determinable
useful life for the bows because the bows were tangible
property used in a trade or business and were subject to
wear and tear from use during the taxable year.  Simon v.
Comm’r, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,552 (2d Cir.
1995), aff'g, 103 T.C. 247 (1994). See also Liddle v.
Comm’r, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,488 (3d Cir.
1995), aff’g, 103 T.C. 285 (1994) p. 150 supra.
The taxpayer corporation made improvements to its
buildings used in its restaurant business and claimed
depreciation under the Asset Depreciation Range for
buildings placed in service before January 1, 1981 and
ACRS for improvements to buildings placed in service after
December 31, 1980. The taxpayer argued that the
improvements were included in the ADR Class 57.0 as
improvements that were part of the structural shell of the
buildings. The Tax Court held that I.R.C. § 1250 property
was not included in the ADR Class 57.0 by statute unless
the IRS explicitly includes the property in the class. Because
the IRS has not included the property in the class, the
improvements had to be depreciated using the 15-year
recovery period for real property. The appellate court
reversed, holding that the property classified under Class
65.0 could be depreciated based on a 10-year useful life.
Walgreen Co. v. Comm’r, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,562 (7th Cir. 1995), rev'g,  103 T.C. 582 (1994).
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS-A L M §
4.02[15].* Prior to November 1990, an S corporation was a
C corporation which had net operating loss carryovers from
previous tax years. The S corporation filed a short tax year
return which showed ordinary losses and disallowed losses.
In 1991, while the corporation was insolvent the corporation
was discharged from an obligation which was not included
in income because of the insolvency exception of I.R.C. §
108(b)(2). For 1991 the corporation had ordinary losses,
I.R.C. § 1231 losses and disallowed losses. The IRS ruled
that, because the discharged indebtedness was not included
in income, the corporation had to reduce tax attributes
before passing any of the income on to the shareholders.
The IRS ruled that, because the C corporation losses could
not be carried over to the S corporation, the C corporation
losses were not reduced by the discharge of indebtedness
income. S corporations first allocate ordinary losses and
I.R.C. § 1231 losses to the shareholders, reducing their stock
basis. The discharge of indebtedness income reduces the
disallowed losses first and then is allocated to the other
corporation tax attributes as listed in I.R.C. § 108(b)(2). Ltr.
Rul. 9541001, Nov. 30, 1994.
The taxpayer was a cooperative housing corporation
which owned residential apartments rented by the
corporation's shareholders.  The property was subject to a
mortgage securing a loan from a bank. The corporation
became insolvent when the fair market value of the property
dropped below the fair market value of the loan principal
and interest. The corporation renegotiated the loan down to
the fair market value of the property. The IRS ruled that the
restructured loan resulted in discharge of indebtedness
income which was excludible from the corporation's income
to the extent of the insolvency at the time of the
restructuring. The amount of excluded discharge of
indebtedness income was to be used to reduce the
corporation tax attributes. Ltr. Rul. 9541020, July 10,
1995.
ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP COSTS. The
taxpayer owned farm land which became contaminated with
pesticides and chemicals when the land was used as an
industrial waste site. The taxpayer donated the land to the
county which attempted to convert the land to recreational
use until the contamination was found and then the county
resold the land back to the taxpayer for nominal
consideration. The taxpayer was responsible for the cleanup
of the land and sought to deduct the costs as ordinary
business expenses under Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35.
The IRS ruled that Rev. Rul. 94-38 did not apply because
the land was not clean when the taxpayer reacquired the
land. The IRS also ruled that the costs were capital costs not
eligible for current deductions because the land was no
longer used in a trade or business. Ltr. Rul. 9541005, Sept.
27, 1995.
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HOBBY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].* The taxpayer was a
computer programmer who also operated a horse racing and
breeding activity. The court found that the activity was
operated in a business like manner in that the taxpayer had
gained substantial expertise in the area, the taxpayer spent a
substantial amount of time at the activity, the taxpayer did
not have substantial income from other sources and the
taxpayer expected profits from appreciation of the horses.
The taxpayer was allowed deductions in excess of income
from the activity. Shane v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1995-
504.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in October
1995, the weighted average is 7.16 percent with the
permissible range of 6.45 to 7.81 percent (90 to 109 percent
permissable range) and 6.45 to 7.88 percent (90 to 110
percent permissable range) for purposes of determining the
full funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 95-
52, I.R.B. 1995-43, 7.
The taxpayers were beneficiaries of an interest in a
pension plan owned by the decedent. The decedent also was
a beneficiary of an interest in a pension plan owned by a
predeceased spouse. The decedent elected to receive
payments in annual installments from both the predeceased
spouse's pension and the decedent's own pension funds. The
IRS ruled that the current beneficiaries were not precluded
from electing a lump sum payment as to both pension plan
payments for purposes of the I.R.C. § 402(d)(1) separate tax
on lump sum distributions. Ltr. Rul. 9541036, July 18,
1995.
REFUNDS. At a time when the decedent was allegedly
mentally incompetent, the decedent filed a request for an
extension to file the 1983 tax return, accompanied by a
check for $7,000; however, the decedent did not include any
reason for the check. The IRS eventually placed the check in
an excess collections account. In 1991, after the decedent's
death, the executor discovered the payment and determined
that the amount paid should have been only $700 and
requested a refund. The IRS argued that the statute of
limitation for a refund had expired and denied the request.
The executor argued that the statute of limitations was
equitably tolled by the decedent's incompetency. The court
held that the statute of limitations on refund actions could be
equitably tolled by the taxpayer's mental incompetency.
Brockamp v. United States, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
60,213 (9th Cir. 1995).
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayer was
the sole shareholder of an S corporation which owed money
to an unrelated bank. The loan was evidenced by two
nonrecourse promissory notes. When the corporation
experienced financial difficulties, another S corporation
owned by the taxpayer's spouse agreed to purchase the loans
from the taxpayer's corporation. In negotiations with the
bank, the notes were purchased at less than face amount
such that the taxpayer's corporation incurred discharge of
indebtedness income. Because the corporation was
insolvent, the exception of I.R.C. § 108 applied. The IRS
ruled that because the two corporations were related, the
purchase of the loans by the spouse's corporation was
treated as a purchase by the taxpayer's corporation. The IRS
also ruled, however, that the exempt nature of the discharge
of indebtedness income did not pass through to the
shareholder as tax exempt income because the excluded
income was to be used to reduce tax attributes of the
corporation, making the discharge of indebtedness income
tax-deferred income. Therefore, the shareholder could not
increase the basis of the stock by the amount of discharge of
indebtedness income. Ltr. Rul. 9541006, July 5, 1995.
SOCIAL SECURITY TAX-ALM § 4.06.*  Beginning
with the January 3, 1996 payment, the monthly social
security benefit payments will increase 2.6 percent to a
maximum of $470 for an individual and $705 for a couple.
The maximum amount of annual wages subject to Old Age
Survivors and Disability Insurance for 1996 is $62,700, with
all wages and self-employment income subject to the
medicare portion of the tax.  For 1996, the maximum
amount of annual earnings before reduction of benefits is
$11,520 for persons aged 65 through 69 and $8,280 for
persons under age 65. The amount of wages necessary for
one quarter of coverage is $640.  Social Security Admin.
News Release, October 13, 1995.
STATE TAXATION
AGRICULTURAL USE. The taxpayer owned a 23.7
acre parcel of land which originally was part of the
taxpayer's farm. The parcel was leased to a neighboring
horse trainer and cattle rancher for use as pasture. In 1991,
no animals were pastured on the land but the land was used
for winter pasture in 1992. The county board of equalization
argued that the land was not eligible for agricultural use
taxation because the land was not actually used for
agricultural purposes in 1991. The court held that the
circumstances of the lease and intended use of the land were
sufficient to support a finding that the property was actually
used for agricultural purposes. The court held that "actual
agricultural use" did not require constant use of property by
the owner or tenant. Clarke v. Douglas Co. Bd. of
Equalization, 899 P.2d 240 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).
REAL PROPERTY. The taxpayer operated a pullet-
raising facility and an egg-laying and feed mill facility. In
making the real property tax assessment for the facilities,
the assessor included grain dryers, scalper, outside tanks,
hammer mill, roller mill, corn auger, distributor head, surge
hoppers, three motors, a motor control center, electrical
panels, weigh hopper, mixers, air compressor, dust control
system, and scale as part of the real property. Under S.D.
Cod. Laws § 10-4-2, real property included all structures on
land. The court held that the equipment was all real property
because the equipment was an integral part of the business
facilities used by the taxpayer. The court noted that several
of the items were affixed to the land or other buildings and
that the other unattached property was essential to the use of
the facilities in the taxpayer's business; therefore, the
equipment was integral to the structures. National Food








AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYER-ALM § 3.05[1].*
The plaintiff's decedent was killed while operating a hay
baler in the employ of the defendant. The decedent's
plaintiff filed a workers' compensation complaint which
was denied on the basis that the defendant was an
agricultural employer exempt from the workers'
compensation law. The defendant owned farm land on
which alfalfa was grown; however, most of the defendant's
business came from contracting with local farmers for the
purchase of their alfalfa crops. The defendant worked
closely with these producers, often providing seed at cost,
advising the farmers about production methods, and
harvesting the crops using the defendant's equipment and
employees. The harvested alfalfa was stored in the
defendant's sheds. The court held that the defendant's
farming activities were sufficient to meet the agricultural
employer exemption. Riggs v. Estate of Standlee, 901
P.2d 1328 (Idaho 1995).
CITATION UPDATES
Smith v. Comm’r, 65 F.3d  37 (5th Cir. 1995), aff’g,
T.C. Memo. 1994-149 (bad debt deduction) see p. 158
supra.
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $100
per year or $35 each.
For your copy, send a check for $115 to Agricultural
Law Press, P.O. Box 50703, Eugene, OR 97405.
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